My research centers on developing both theoretical and statistical models for analyzing heterogeneous and dynamic political process under various contexts, with a special focus on party competition, legislative decision making, and political representation and accountability of coalition governance in European countries. My research unites two strands of significant political science inquiry: the development of game theoretical models to explain dynamic strategic decisions of political actors, and the refinement of quantitative (in particular quantile models, Bayesian methods and a combination of the two) and experimental methods to better test empirical hypotheses derived from theoretical models.
PhD in Political Science, 2021
University of Mannheim
MA in Political Science, 2017
University of Mannheim
BA in International Liberal Studies, 2015
LLB in International Politics, 2015
Project C1 Legislative reforms and party competition.
Although democratic governance imposes temporal constraints, the timing of government policymaking activities such as bill initiation is still poorly understood. This holds especially under coalition governments, in which government bills need to find approval by a partner party in parliament. We propose a dynamic temporal perspective, in which at the beginning of a term ministers do not know whether they face a cooperative or competitive partner but they learn this over time and use their agenda control to time further bill initiation in response. A circular regression analysis using data on more than 25,000 government bills from 11 parliamentary democracies over 30 years supports this temporal perspective, showing that ministers initiate bills later in the term when their previous bills have experienced greater scrutiny. Ministers further delay bill initiation when coalition parties' incentives to deviate from compromise increase and when they have less power to constrain their bills' scrutiny.
We explain the referendums on British membership of the European Communities and European Union from a principal–agent perspective between the Prime Minister and the rank-and-file. We show that announcing a referendum on the Prime Minister’s membership proposal helps the incumbent party to win the general election when the rank-and-file is divided on the terms of membership. When the Prime Minister overcomes the rank-and-file’s mistrust of her effectiveness in negotiating new membership terms with other member states, the voters are more likely to follow her proposal. However, when intra-party controversies reveal principal–agent problems, the initially uninformed voters can learn about the dysfunctionality of the terms and are more likely to reject the Prime Minister’s proposal.
In political science, data with heterogeneous units are used in many studies, such as those involving legislative proposals in different policy areas, electoral choices by different types of voters, and government formation in varying party systems. To disentangle decision-making mechanisms by units, traditional discrete choice models focus exclusively on the conditional mean and ignore the heterogeneous effects within a population. This paper proposes a conditional binary quantile model that goes beyond this limitation to analyze discrete response data with varying alternative-specific features. This model offers an in-depth understanding of the relationship between the explanatory and response variables. Compared to conditional mean-based models, the conditional binary quantile model relies on weak distributional assumptions and is more robust to distributional misspecification. The model also relaxes the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives, which is often violated in practice. The method is applied to a range of political studies to show the heterogeneous effects of explanatory variables across the conditional distribution. Substantive interpretations from counterfactual scenarios are used to illustrate how the conditional binary quantile model captures unobserved heterogeneity, which extant models fail to do. The results point to the risk of averaging out the heterogeneous effects across units by conditional mean-based models.
Analyzing Political Cycles as Heterogeneous Circular Data of Timing. PolMeth Europe, 2022.
Legislative Decision Making and Law Compliance in the EU(with Thomas König). 79th Annual MPSA Conference, 2022.
Beyond the Average: Empirical Hypothesis Testing with Heterogeneous Effects across the Distribution of the Outcomes. 78th Annual MPSA Conference, 2021.
Helping or Sanctioning? Heterogeneous Effects in the Strategic Analysis of International Compliance(with Thomas König). 11th Annual Conference of the European Political Science Association, 2021.
How to Identify Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde in Strategic Sequential Choices? Player Heterogeneity and Quantile Models(with Thomas König). PolMeth Europe, 2021.
Beyond the Average: Hypothesis Testing with Quantile Mixture”. ECPR General Conference, 2020, Innsbruck, Austria. (Virtual presentation due to Covid-19.)
Should I Stay or Should I Go? The British Membership Game between Prime Ministers, the Rank-and-File, and the Voters (with Thomas König). EPSA Annual conference, 2020, Prague, Czech. (One of the 20 papers in the track accepted for virtual presentation).
Divided Parties, Heterogeneous Voters and Electoral Choice (with Felix Olsowski). 77th Annual MPSA Conference, 2019, Chicago, USA.
Discrete Choice Data with Unobserved Heterogeneity: A Conditional Binary Quantile Model. 77th Annual MPSA Conference, 2019, Chicago, USA.
Player Heterogeneity and Equilibrium Multiplicity: Local Identification Using a Bayesian Strategic Quantile Model(with Thomas König). Joint Annual Conference of the GPSA Methods of Political Science Section and the SPSA Empirical Methodology Working Group, 2019, Basel, Switzerland.
American Political Science Review
American Journal of Political Science
European Union Politics